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Abstract  
 
This paper contributes to the empirical investigation of the causality relations between 
real GDP growth and the growth of three debt categories, namely public, foreign and 
private debt, in the universe of the 28 European Union countries during the past decade. 
By using panel Granger causality estimations, we find nonstatistically significant 
causality between foreign debt and economic growth and the limited importance of the 
causality between private debt and real GDP growth. On the contrary, the results 
obtained show statistically relevant bidirectional causality relations between public debt 
and economic growth, and this is true before and after the outbreak of the recent 
financial crisis. Moreover, there is clear evidence of economic growth’s contribution to 
the decrease in public debt. 
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Debt and economic growth in the European Union: what causes what? 
 
1. Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis increased concerns about the possible consequences 
of high debt levels on economic growth in many countries and regions around the world, 
especially in European Union countries. Authors such as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 
2010) support that not only may financial crises contribute to the increase of debt, 
particularly public debt, but also the ways in which this debt builds up, as well as the 
defined payment strategies, can have important economic impacts, especially in cases 
of high debt levels, when they will constitute real restrictions to economic growth. 
However, the issue of whether debt affects growth or, on the contrary, economic growth 
causes debt (or even if there is support for both directions of causality) is still far from 
consensus. Further, the possibility of existence and the direction of causality relations 
between debt and growth is still a timely object of theoretical discussion and empirically 
testing. 
Most of the known empirical studies have concentrated on the importance of foreign 
debt in developing countries. Fewer works have empirically tested the influence of 
public debt on economic growth in advanced economies and their results are 
inconclusive (as well documented in Panizza and Presbitero, 2013). Some of these 
analyses are aware that reverse causality from low growth to high public debt may exist 
and that an endogeneity problem may arise, and they have attempted to overcome this 
problem by using the instrumental variable approach (see, among others, Pattillo et al., 
2004; Cordella et al., 2005; Presbitero, 2010). 
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In what concerns the influence of private debt, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) believe that 
for the years immediately following the crisis, private debt, in contrast to public debt, 
tended to shrink sharply for an extended period. Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) 
also consider that the stock of private debt is an important additional variable to keep in 
mind when investigating the relationship between public debt and economic growth. In 
particular, the negative impact of public debt on growth could conceivably be stronger 
in countries with high private debt burdens. Simultaneously, Nersisyan and Wray (2010) 
underline that we should not consider that “debt is debt” because there are important 
differences between private and public indebtedness, namely the fact that for a 
government with a sovereign currency, there is no imperative to borrow. 
This paper seeks to contribute to the analysis of the causality relations between three 
different kinds of debt categories, namely public, foreign and private debt, and economic 
growth in the 28 member states of the EU during the past decade. It also analyses the 
possible differences after the outbreak of the recent financial crisis considering two 
panels: 2001–2012 and 2007–2012. 
The main findings point to some clear differences in the Granger causality relations 
between the three considered debt categories and economic growth. The results confirm 
the statistically relevant bidirectional causality relations between public debt and 
economic growth. Moreover, for both time periods, the results obtained are stronger for 
the causality running from real GDP growth to the growth in public debt than for the 
reverse causality running from public debt to economic growth. Furthermore, there is 
evidence of some Keynesian effects documented by the clear positive causality running 
from public debt to economic growth and these effects were particularly strong for the 
years after the outbreak of the recent global financial crisis (here represented by 2007–
2012). 
4 
 
The results obtained for foreign debt point to statistically weaker causality relations 
between this debt and the economic growth rate in EU countries but there is still a 
general tendency towards positive bidirectional causality relations between foreign debt 
and economic growth. Finally, for private debt the results point to its relevance for the 
economic growth of EU countries during the past decade and there is clear evidence of 
negative causality running from private debt to the real GDP growth rate for the entire 
time period (2001–2012).  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the relevant 
theoretical and empirical references; section 3 describes the adopted methodology and 
data; section 4 reports the main results obtained and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Relevant theoretical and empirical references 
The theoretical literature mostly analyses the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth and tends to defend that, in the short run, and particularly at moderate 
levels of government debt, there are Keynesian effects, meaning that public expenses 
clearly contribute to economic growth (supported, among others, by Elmendorf and 
Mankiw, 1999). 
However, in the long run and in the presence of high levels of government debt, non-
Keynesian effects will take place. There are fears that the payment of this high debt will 
imply future increases in taxes, contributing to a reduction in private consumption and 
investment expenses and consequently slowing down economic growth, as supported 
by the neoclassical view (e.g. Modigliani, 1961; Diamond, 1965; Saint-Paul, 1992; 
Aizenman et al., 2007). 
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There is also another theoretical explanation, known as the Ricardian equivalence, 
which, in contrast with the two previous views, defends that public indebtedness does 
not affect economic growth. According to the Ricardian equivalence proposition (see, 
among others, Barro, 1989; Galí et al., 2007), an increase in public expenses may 
accelerate economic growth in one period. However, afterwards, economic agents will 
react and in the presence of tax rises and other austerity measures, they will decrease 
their consumption and investment expenses, slowing down economic growth and 
compensating for the effect of the public expenses increase on economic growth. 
Empirically, few works have tested the relationship between debt and economic growth 
and their findings are far from conclusive. Most of the known empirical studies address 
the relationship between external debt and growth, focusing on developing countries. 
Among these works, for instance, Pattillo et al. (2004) use a panel dataset of 61 
developing countries over the period 1969–1998 and conclude that, on average, for 
countries with high debt, doubling debt will reduce output growth by about 1 percentage 
point. At the same time, Cordella et al. (2005) analyse how the debt–growth relationship 
varies with indebtedness levels in an unbalanced panel of 79 developing countries over 
the period 1970–2002 and conclude that there is a negative marginal relationship 
between debt and growth at intermediate levels of debt, but not at very low debt levels. 
Schclarek (2004) applies the system generalised method of moments (GMM) dynamic 
panel econometric technique to a data set consisting of a panel of 59 developing 
countries and 24 industrialised countries with data averaged over each of the seven five-
year periods between 1970 and 2002. For developing countries, the author finds that 
lower total external debt levels are associated with higher growth rates and that this 
negative relationship is driven by the incidence of public external debt, but not by 
private external debt. Moreover, the author does not find any support for an inverted U-
6 
 
shaped relationship between external debt and growth. Further, particularly for 
industrialised countries, he finds no robust linear or nonlinear relationship between 
gross government debt and economic growth, suggesting that higher public debt levels 
are not necessarily associated with lower GDP growth rates in developed countries. 
Pattillo et al. (2011), also using a panel for 1969–1998 but now of 93 developing 
countries, analyse the impact of external debt and debt reduction on growth, with 
different panel estimation techniques (i.e. fixed effects and dynamic system GMM). 
They find that the average impact of debt on per capita growth seems to become negative 
for debt levels above 30–40% of GDP but that the marginal impact becomes negative 
for debt levels around 15–20%. This study also concludes that, at low levels of external 
debt, the impact on economic growth seems to be positive. 
In what concerns the empirically testing of public debt’s influence on economic growth, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) use simple correlation statistics to analyse the evolution of 
gross central government debt and the growth rate of long-term real GDP in a sample 
of 20 developed countries over a very long time period (1790–2009). They conclude 
that the relationship between public debt and economic growth depends on the level of 
indebtedness; more precisely, this relationship is relevant only in the presence of 
debt/GDP ratios above 90%. The same conclusion, pointing to the importance of the 
level of indebtedness, was obtained by Kumar and Woo (2010), who use econometric 
techniques to analyse a sample of emerging and advanced economies for 1970–2007 
and also confirm the existence of a linear inverse relation between debt and economic 
growth. 
Similar conclusions were obtained by Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), using 
data sourced from the AMECO database and considering a sample of 12 Eurozone 
countries for 1970–2011. They point to the existence of a concave, inverted U-shaped 
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relationship between public debt and the economic growth rate with the debt turning 
point at about 90–100% of GDP. Closely in line with this research, Baum et al. (2013), 
also using AMECO and data for 12 Eurozone countries but for the interval 1990–2010, 
conclude that the short-run impact of debt on GDP growth is positive and highly 
statistically significant, but decreases to around zero and loses significance beyond 
public debt-to-GDP ratios of around 67%. Furthermore, for debt to GDP ratios above 
95%, additional debt has a negative impact on economic activity. 
At the same time, Afonso and Jales (2013), using a panel of 155 countries over the 
period 1970–2008, assess the links between economic growth, total factor productivity 
and government debt. They conclude that there is a general negative effect of 
government debt on growth. In particular, for the subsample including OECD countries, 
there is evidence that the average growth rates of the countries with low debt to GDP 
ratios (lower than 30%) are similar to those of countries with high debt ratios (higher 
than 90%). 
Simultaneously, Égert (2013) tests the Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) dataset by using 
formal econometric methods in order to see whether public debt has a negative nonlinear 
effect on growth if public debt exceeds 90% of GDP. Égert (2013) concludes that the 
negative relationship between debt and growth is sensitive to modelling choices 
(including the time dimension, country coverage considered, data frequency and 
assumptions on the minimum number of observations required). 
Concentrating on advanced economies, Panizza and Presbitero (2013) survey the recent 
literature on the links between public debt and economic growth and conclude that 
although most empirical works using simple back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest 
the existence of a negative effect on economic growth, this effect is likely to be small. 
Furthermore, when more sophisticated models are used, they yield uncertain results on 
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the relationship between debt and growth. In addition, in what concerns the correlations 
and possible causality relations between debt and growth, Panizza and Presbitero (2012, 
2013) point to the fact that a negative correlation between debt and growth does not by 
itself imply causality because low economic growth leads to high levels of debt. 
As regards the empirical estimations concentrating on the causality relations between 
debt and growth, recent empirical tests have provided some answers but they are still 
rather inconclusive. On one side, we have works supporting the (mostly negative) 
causality running from debt to economic growth. Among these contributions, 
Chowdhury (2001) uses panel causality tests to analyse the impact of foreign debt on 
growth in low and middle income countries, covering 1982–1999, and concludes that 
the causality runs from debt to growth, with a significant negative causal impact of debt 
on growth. 
Pattillo et al. (2004) find evidence of a negative and significant causality effect running 
from total external debt to economic growth (even after accounting for the possible 
endogeneity of debt to the growth process). These authors also state that their results are 
shown to be compatible with a simultaneous significant effect of growth on debt ratios, 
as suggested, for instance, by Easterly (2001). 
On the other side, some authors find empirical evidence that confirms the existence of 
causality occurring between output growth and debt ratios. Representing this strand of 
the literature, Easterly (2001) maintains that lower growth decreases tax revenues and 
primary surpluses, and without adjustment, debt ratios will explode, as occurred after 
the worldwide slowdown in growth in the 1970s. This growth slowdown was an 
important cause of the debt crises in middle income countries in the 1980s, the crisis in 
highly indebted poor countries in the 1980s and 1990s and the increased public debt 
burden of industrialised countries in the same decades. 
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Finally, there is also empirical support for both directions of causality between debt and 
growth. For instance, Abbas and Christensen (2007) use a specific public domestic debt 
database, covering 93 low income countries and emerging markets over 1975–2004, and 
apply Granger causality regressions and panel data methods to test the relationship 
between debt and economic growth. They conclude that there is bidirectional and 
statistically significant causality; public domestic debt has a strong positive impact on 
per capita income and although not as statistically strong, economic growth also has a 
clear positive impact on public domestic debt. 
Jayaraman and Lau (2009) apply panel Granger causality estimations to examine the 
relationship between external/public debt and economic growth in six Pacific island 
countries during 1985–2004. Their empirical results indicate a lack of evidence of a 
long-run Granger causality relationship between real output and the external debt to 
GDP ratio or between the same output index and the budget deficit to GDP ratio; 
however, in the short run, there is a significant causal relationship running from external 
debt and also budget deficit to output. In regard to the reverse relationship, in the long 
run, the results also point to the absence of causality; and in the short run, there is 
evidence of Granger causality running from output to external debt but not from output 
to public deficit. 
Butts (2009) also empirically tests the direction of the Granger causality relationship 
between economic growth and short-term external debt in 27 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries over the period 1970–2003. The main results of this work suggest 
the existence of bidirectional causality relationships between the two variables for 
several countries, which means that the performance of both variables is interrelated. 
There is also clear evidence that in the short and long run, Granger causality from 
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economic growth to short-term external debt is present in 13 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. 
Ferreira (2009) addresses the Granger causality relationship between public debt and 
GDP, more precisely between the growth in real GDP per capita and public debt, 
represented by the current primary surplus/GDP and gross government debt/GDP ratios. 
By using OECD annual data for 20 countries between 1988 and 2001, clear Granger 
bidirectional causality was found.  
 
 
3. Methodology and data 
We use a methodology based on panel Granger causality tests because we want to 
analyse the direction of the causality relations between economic growth and the 
different debt categories. More precisely, we want to test if the evolution of debt 
precedes economic growth or, on the contrary, if economic growth precedes the different 
kinds of debt (or even if these relationships are bidirectional). 
We follow the conventional Granger causality test (Granger, 1969) as well as more 
recent approaches developed to analyse the existence of causality relationships among 
variables in panels by such authors as Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001), Kónya 
(2006) and Bangake and Eggoh (2011). 
According to this Granger causality concept, correlation does not imply causality and a 
cause cannot come after its effect. This means that a variable, X, is said to Granger cause 
another variable Y, if the current value of this variable Y (Yt) significantly depends on 
the past values of the variable X, that is, Xt-1, Xt-2, … (but not on its present value, Xt). 
Under these conditions, the starting point of our methodology is the estimation of a 
general linear panel Granger causality model with two equations: 
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where i = 1,...,N cross units; t = 1,...,T time periods;  = intercepts; k = 1,...K lags;  
= error terms (including not only the disturbance terms, but also the individual cross-
unit specific effects). 
To test Granger noncausality from x to y in equation 1 (or from y to x in equation 2), 
the null hypothesis is N1,...,i0,β:H io  . The alternative hypothesis states that 
there is a causality relationship from x to y (or from y to x) for at least one cross-unit of 
the panel: 1)
N
N(0   N;2...,N1,Ni0,β  ;N1,...,i0,β :H 111i1i1  . 
In order to ascertain the strength of the Granger causality relations in each estimated 
equation, it is possible to analyse the joint significance by using a Wald test of the 
obtained i for the different time lags (t-1, t-2,…). 
Our data are sourced from the European Commission’s AMECO dataset, which is based 
on a commonly agreed methodology that guarantees the time and country consistency 
of the provided statistical information. To represent economic growth (GROWTH), we 
use the series of the “Real GDP growth rate - 1 year % change”. The considered debt 
categories are proxied by the three following series: 
 “General government gross debt (Maastricht debt) as a % of GDP - annual data” 
representing public debt (PUBDEBT); 
 The country’s “Net external debt as a % GDP - annual data” representing foreign 
debt (FORDEBT); 
 The “Private debt as a % of GDP - consolidated - annual data” representing 
private debt (PRIVDEBT). 
12 
 
 
The dataset consists of two balanced panels, both including all 28 EU countries. The 
first panel is for 2001–2012 and the second one only for the subinterval of 2007–2012, 
as we aim to analyse the possible changes provoked by the outbreak of the recent global 
financial crisis. 
Before proceeding with our estimations, we need to test the stationarity of the used 
series. The number of observations in our panels does not recommend the application 
of single-unit root tests for time series. Therefore, we opt to use panel unit root tests, 
which not only increase the power of unit root tests due to the span of the observations, 
but also minimise the risks of structural breaks. Among the available panel unit root 
tests, here we choose to use the Levin et al. (2002) test and the Im et al. (2003) test. 
The Levin et al. (2002) test can be viewed as a pooled Dickey–Fuller test, or as an 
augmented Dickey–Fuller test, when lags are included and the null hypothesis is the 
existence of nonstationarity. This test is adequate for heterogeneous panels of moderate 
size, such as the panels used in this paper with fixed effects, and it assumes that there is 
a common unit root process. It implements an ADF regression 
(3)                          
1
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where i = 1,…N = cross-units of the panel; t = 1,…T = time series observations; L= 
1,…, P = lag orders; dmt = vector of deterministic variables, with m = the corresponding 
vector of coefficients for a particular model. Assuming that =1- and 1 = …= N, the 
null hypothesis is H0:  = 0 and the alternative, H1: =  <0. 
The results presented in Table 1 allow us to reject the existence of the null hypothesis 
and to accept that the series are stationary. 
Table 1 – Panel unit root Levin et al. (2002) test  
 
PANEL I (2001–2012)   
Variables t-star P > t 
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“GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 year % change) -16.37326 0.0000
“PUBDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of the general government  
gross debt, Maastricht debt, (as a % of GDP - annual data) 
-7.57804 0.0000
“FORDEBT” = First difference of the net external debt as a % GDP - annual data -14.87471 0.0000
“PRIVDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of private debt as a % of 
GDP (consolidated, annual data) 
-7.97828 0.0000
   
PANEL II (2007–2012)   
Variables t-star P > t 
“GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 year % change) -13.93477 0.0000
“PUBDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of the general government  
gross debt, Maastricht debt, (as a % of GDP - annual data) 
-27.17360 0.0000
“FORDEBT” = First difference of the net external debt as a % GDP - annual data -12.80286 0.0000
“PRIVDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of private debt as a % of 
GDP (consolidated, annual data) 
-21.25655 0.0000
 
 
The Im et al. (2003) test estimates the t-test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels and 
allows for individual unit root processes. It is based on the mean of the individual 
Dickey–Fuller t-statistics of each unit in the panel and it assumes that all series are 
nonstationary under the null hypothesis. The core equation, presented with this test, is 
the following: 
(4)                                     
1
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where =1- and i may vary across cross-sections. The null hypothesis is now H0:  = 
0, for all i. The alternative, H1, considers that at least some of the individual processes 
might be stationary, thus, i = 0, for a subsample of the cross units ( i = 1, …, Nj); i < 
0, for the rest of the cross units ( i = Nj, Nj+1, … N). Table 2 reports the results obtained 
with this test, which tend to confirm the rejection of nonstationarity. 
 
Table 2 – Panel unit root Im et al. (2003) test  
 
PANEL I (2001–2012) 
PANEL I (2001-2012)   
Variables W[t-
bar]     
P-
value 
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“GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 year % 
change) 
-11.462 0.000 
“PUBDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of the general 
government gross debt, Maastricht debt, (in % of GDP -  annual data) 
-4.140 0.000 
“FORDEBT” = First difference of the net external debt in % GDP - 
annual data 
-9.919 0.000 
“PRIVDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of the private 
debt in % of GDP  (consolidated, annual data) 
-4.823 0.000 
   
PANEL II (2007-2012)   
Variables W[t-
bar]     
P-
value 
“GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 year % 
change) 
-2.377 0.009 
“PUBDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of the general 
government  
gross debt, Maastricht debt, (in % of GDP -  annual data) 
-8.574 0.000 
“FORDEBT” = First difference of the net external debt in % GDP - 
annual data 
-1.656 0.049 
“PRIVDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of the private 
debt in % of GDP  (consolidated, annual data) 
-5.206 0.000 
 
 
Appendix I presents, for both panels, the summary statistics of the defined variables and 
the values of the correlations between economic growth and the proxies for the debt 
categories. 
 
 
4. Results 
In order to analyse the causality relations between economic growth (GROWTH) and 
the three debt categories presented in the previous section, we use panel estimations, 
which are particularly adequate for cross-section studies, in our case, covering short or 
medium time periods. As stated before, our dataset includes two balanced panels, both 
including the 28 EU countries, but one for 2001–2012 and the second for 2007–2012. 
Here, we compare the results obtained, for both panels, with three panel estimations, 
namely panel random-effects estimations (which the Hausman test shows are preferred 
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to panel fixed-effects estimations 1 ), ordinary least squares (OLS) robust panel 
estimations and dynamic GMM panel estimations, which control for the potential 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables and reduce the potential bias in the estimated 
coefficients. Next, we present the results obtained for the panel Granger causality 
relations between economic growth and the three debt proxies.  
 
4.1.  Panel Granger causality between economic growth and public debt 
Appendix II reports the obtained results with random-effects, OLS robust and dynamic 
GMM two-step system robust panel estimates for the causality relations between the 
growth of the proxy chosen to represent public debt and the real GDP growth rate. 
In what concerns the causality running from public debt to economic growth, according 
to the results presented in the first half of Appendix II (II-A), there is evidence that the 
growth in public debt contributes positively to the increase in the real GDP growth rate. 
In general, the results are statistically more significant for Panel 2, which considers only 
the years after the outbreak of the recent financial crisis (2007–2012). Furthermore, for 
both panels, the statistically more solid results are obtained with the dynamic GMM 
two-step system robust panel estimates, confirming the potential adequacy and qualities 
of this estimation method in this kind of model and with the used variables. 
On the other side, for the causality running from economic growth to public debt, the 
results reported in the second half of Appendix II (II-B) clearly show that, for both 
panels, the increase in the real GDP growth rate contributes negatively to public debt 
growth, although this effect is statistically stronger in the short time (t-1) than afterwards 
(t-2). 
                                                            
1 The results obtained by using the panel fixed-effects estimations and Hausman test are not reported in the 
paper but they are available on request. 
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The estimation results presented in Appendix II are summarised in Tables 3 and 4. Table 
3 clearly shows that in spite of the positive values of the Granger coefficients, 
representing the sums of the betas obtained with the estimation of equation (1), for Panel 
1 (which considers 2001–2012) the influence of public debt on economic growth is 
statistically significant only when we use the dynamic GMM two-step system robust 
panel estimates. Moreover, in this case the Wald tests indicate that not only the growth 
of “PUBDEBT”t-1 alone but also the joint influence of “PUBDEBT”t-1 and 
“PUBDEBT”t-2 are relevant to the evolution of the real GDP annual growth rate. 
In what concerns Panel 2 (for 2007–2012), and still according to the values of the 
Granger coefficients and the Wald test results reported in Table 3, there is clear and 
statistically strong evidence that the growth in public debt (in t-1 and jointly in t-1 and 
t-2) contributes positively to the increase in the real GDP growth rate. Moreover, this is 
true for the results obtained with all three panel estimation methods. 
 
TABLE 3 – CAUSALITY RUNNING FROM PUBLIC DEBT TO ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
                                     PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
Explanatory variables RE OLS GMM 
GROWTH  t-1 - *** - - *** 
GROWTH  t-2 - *** - *** - *** 
PUBDEBT t-1 + + - ** 
PUBDEBT t-2 +  +  + ** 
Constant -  +  -  
Number of observations 306 306 306 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    0.00 
    Prob > chi2 =    
0.9630 
F(1,   264) =    0.15 
  Prob > F =    0.7033 
chi2(1) =    3.82 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0508 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 
0) 
chi2(2) =    0.28 
    Prob > chi2 =    
0.8710 
F(2,   264) =    0.09 
  Prob > F =    0.9148 
chi2(2) =    9.29 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0096 
GRANGER 
COEFFICIENT 
0.3946005 0.2847271 5.66531 
 
                                     PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
Explanatory variables RE OLS GMM 
GROWTH  t-1 - *** - - *** 
GROWTH  t-2 - *** - *** - *** 
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PUBDEBT t-1 + ** + * + *** 
PUBDEBT t-2 + *** + *** + *** 
Constant - ** -  -  
Number of observations 138 138 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    3.67 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0553 
F(1,   102) =    3.60 
 Prob > F =    0.0607 
chi2(1) =    6.33 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0119 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 
0) 
chi2(2) =   36.56 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
F(2,   102) =    7.52 
 Prob > F =    0.0009 
chi2(2) =   15.60 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0004 
GRANGER 
COEFFICIENT 
 
5.258781 
 
4.497878 
 
15.58635 
+ Positive effect; - negative effect. * Statistically significant at 10%; ** statistically significant at 5%; *** statistically 
significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable: “GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 year % change); 
explanatory variable: “PUBDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of the general government 
gross debt, Maastricht debt, (as a % of GDP - annual data) 
 
In Table 4, we summarise the results presented in Appendix II (II-B) for the causality 
running from real GDP growth to the growth in public debt. In all situations, namely for 
all panel estimation methods and for both panels, there is clear evidence of the 
statistically significant negative influence of economic growth on public debt. The 
comparison of the Wald test results reported in Tables 3 and 4 also allows us to conclude 
that the Granger panel causality running from economic growth to public debt is 
statistically much stronger that that running from public debt to economic growth. 
TABLE 4 – CAUSALITY RUNNING FROM ECONOMIC GROWTH TO 
PUBLIC DEBT  
                                     PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
Explanatory variables RE OLS GMM 
PUBDEBT t-1 - - -  
PUBDEBT t-2 +  +  +  
GROWTH  t-1 - *** - *** - *** 
GROWTH  t-2 -  -  -  
Constant + ***  + * + *** 
Number of observations 306 306 306 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =   22.43 
 Prob > chi2 =    
0.0000 
F(1,   264) =    7.47 
Prob > F =    0.0067 
chi2(1) =   27.25 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 
0) 
chi2(2) =   22.43 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
F(2,   264) =    4.14 
Prob > F =    0.0169 
chi2(2) =   61.24 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
GRANGER 
COEFFICIENT 
-0.0135857 -0.0164532 -0.0248126 
 
                                     PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
Explanatory variables RE OLS GMM 
PUBDEBT t-1 - ** - - *** 
PUBDEBT t-2 - *** -  - *** 
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GROWTH  t-1 - ***  - ***  - *** 
GROWTH  t-2 -  +  - ** 
Constant + *** -  + ***  
Number of observations 138 138 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    7.83 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0051 
F(1,   102) =    7.32 
 Prob > F =    0.0080 
chi2(1) =   14.52 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0001 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 
0) 
chi2(2) =    8.88 
    Prob > chi2 =    
0.0118 
F(2,   102) =    5.85 
 Prob > F =    0.0039 
chi2(2) =   14.57 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0007 
GRANGER 
COEFFICIENT 
-0.0055294 -0.0084994 -0.0208284 
+ Positive effect; - negative effect. * Statistically significant at 10%; ** statistically significant at 5%; *** statistically 
significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable: “PUBDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of the general government gross debt, 
Maastricht debt, (as a % of GDP - annual data); explanatory variable: “GROWTH” = First difference of the real 
GDP growth rate (1 year % change). 
 
 
4.2.  Panel Granger causality between economic growth and foreign debt 
Appendix III presents the results of the random-effects, OLS and GMM robust panel 
estimations of the Granger causality relations between economic growth and the proxy 
used to represent the growth in “FORDEBT” (net external debt as a percentage of GDP). 
In what regards the Granger causality running from “FORDEBT” to GDP, the results 
reported in Table III-A of Appendix III, show that, in general terms, and for both time 
panels, the impact of external debt on economic growth is not statistically relevant. On 
the other side, for the reverse causality running from economic growth to foreign debt, 
the estimation results presented in Table III-B of Appendix III allow us to conclude that, 
although not statistically strong, there is evidence of a positive causality relation running 
from the real GDP growth rate to the growth in “FORDEBT” as all Granger coefficients 
are positive. 
Tables 5 and 6 summarise the estimation results presented in Appendix III. For the panel 
Granger causality running from the growth rate of foreign debt to the real GDP growth 
rate, Table 5 clearly shows that with one exception (OLS estimations of Panel 2 and 
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only in the short run) this causality is not statistically strong. For Panel 2, the values of 
the Granger coefficients point to a positive causality but the results for Panel 1 are rather 
ambiguous. 
 
TABLE 5 – CAUSALITY RUNNING FROM FOREIGN DEBT TO 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
                                     PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
Explanatory variables RE OLS GMM 
GROWTH  t-1 - *** - - *** 
GROWTH  t-2 - *** - *** - *** 
FORDEBT t-1 - + - 
FORDEBT t-2 +  + + 
Constant -  + - ** 
Number of observations 306 306 306 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    0.06 
Prob > chi2 =    0.8054 
F(1,   264) =    0.23 
    Prob > F =    0.6316 
chi2(2) =    1.67 
Prob > chi2 =    0.4334 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 
0) 
chi2(2) =    0.57  
Prob > chi2 =    0.7508 
    F(2,   264) =    0.88 
     Prob > F =    0.4163 
chi2(1) =    1.41 
Prob > chi2 =    0.2356 
GRANGER 
COEFFICIENT 
-0.0005013 0.0010242 -0.0094345 
 
                                     PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
Explanatory variables RE OLS GMM 
GROWTH  t-1 - *** - - *** 
GROWTH  t-2 - *** - *** - *** 
FORDEBT t-1 + +*** + 
FORDEBT t-2 -  -  + 
Constant - ** + - 
Number of observations              138 138 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    1.07 
Prob > chi2 =    0.3006 
 F(1,   102) =   33.98 
 Prob > F =    0.0000 
chi2(2) =    0.64 
  Prob > chi2 =    
0.7278 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 
0) 
chi2(2) =    1.09 
Prob > chi2 =    0.5800 
F(2,   102) =   24.33 
Prob > F =    0.0000 
chi2(1) =    0.56 
Prob > chi2 =    0.4560 
GRANGER 
COEFFICIENT 
0.001083 0.0008487 0.0115659 
+ Positive effect; - negative effect. * Statistically significant at 10%; ** statistically significant at 5%; *** statistically 
significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable: “GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 year % change); explanatory 
variable: “FORDEBT” = First difference of the net external debt as a % GDP (annual data). 
 
The results obtained for the panel Granger causality running from real GDP to foreign 
debt (“FORDEBT”) are summarised in Table 6. According to the values of the Granger 
coefficients, in all situations, economic growth has a positive impact on the growth in 
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“FORDEBT”. This positive impact is statistically more relevant in the short run (for t-
1) in Panel 1 when we opt to use the GMM estimations and in both panels when using 
the random-effects estimations. 
 
TABLE 6 – CAUSALITY RUNNING FROM ECONOMIC GROWTH TO 
FOREIGN DEBT  
                                     PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
Explanatory variables RE OLS GMM 
FORDEBT t-1 - - - 
FORDEBT t-2 - ** - -* 
GROWTH  t-1 +*** + + 
GROWTH  t-2 + + - 
Constant -  - - 
Number of observations 306 306 306 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    7.47 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0063 
F(1,   264) =    0.76 
Prob > F =    0.3855 
chi2(1) =    2.07 
Prob > chi2 =    0.1501 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 
0) 
chi2(2) =    7.71 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0211 
F(2,   264) =    0.51 
Prob > F =    0.6029 
chi2(2) =    2.71 
Prob > chi2 =    0.2582 
GRANGER 
COEFFICIENT 
2.030623 2.290539 17.64606 
 
                                     PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
Explanatory variables RE OLS GMM 
FORDEBT t-1 - * ‐  +*** 
FORDEBT t-2 +***  +  ‐ 
GROWTH  t-1 +*  ‐  +** 
GROWTH  t-2 +  +  ‐** 
Constant +  ‐  ‐** 
Number of observations 138 138 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    3.50 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0612 
F(2,   102) =    1.60 
Prob > F =    0.2061 
chi2(1) =    3.70 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0543 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 
0) 
chi2(2) =    3.65 
Prob > chi2 =    0.1616 
F(1,   102) =    0.02 
Prob > F =    0.8824 
chi2(2) =    4.38 
Prob > chi2 =    0.1120 
GRANGER 
COEFFICIENT 
2.1559861 2.920993 20.71023 
+ Positive effect; - negative effect. * Statistically significant at 10%; ** statistically significant at 5%; *** statistically 
significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable: “FORDEBT” = First difference of the net external debt as a % GDP (annual data); explanatory 
variable: “GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 year % change). 
 
 
4.3.  Panel Granger causality between economic growth and private debt 
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The details of the estimation results of equations 1 and 2 presented in section 3 using 
the three estimations are presented in Appendix IV. As before, as well as in the first part 
of Appendix IV (Table IV-A), we report the results obtained for the panel Granger 
causality running from the growth rate of the ratio of private debt to GDP to the real 
GDP growth rate. These results are neither unanimous nor statistically strong but there 
is a general tendency pointing to the negative causality of private debt on GDP. In what 
concerns the reverse causality from GDP to private debt, the results obtained are 
presented in the second part of Appendix IV (Table IV-B). In most situations, the results 
are not statistically strong, showing that the real GDP growth rate is not a relevant cause 
of the growth rate of private debt as a percentage of GDP. 
Tables 7 and 8 summarise the results presented in Appendix IV. Table 7 shows that the 
values of the Ganger coefficients (representing the sum of the betas obtained with the 
estimation of equation 1) indicate that, with only one exception, a negative influence of 
private debt growth on the real GDP growth rate. According to the Wald tests obtained 
with the dynamic GMM estimates, that is, the ones that can reduce the potential bias of 
the estimated coefficients and control for potential endogeneity, “PRIVDEBT”, not only 
in the previous year (in t-1) but also in t-1 and t-2, is relevant for explaining the evolution 
of economic growth. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7 – CAUSALITY RUNNING FROM PRIVATE DEBT TO ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
                                     PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
Explanatory variables RE OLS GMM 
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GROWTH  t-1 - *** - - *** 
GROWTH  t-2 - *** - *** - *** 
PRIVDEBT t-1 - -  - *** 
PRIVDEBT t-2 - *** + *** -  
Constant -  +  +  
Number of observations 306 306 306 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    2.00 
Prob > chi2 =    0.1573 
F(1,   264) =    1.20 
Prob > F =    0.2736 
chi2(1) =    7.68 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0056 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 
0) 
chi2(2) =   12.95 
 Prob > chi2 =    
0.0015 
F(2,   264) =    7.21 
Prob > F =    0.0009 
chi2(2) =   10.33 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0057 
GRANGER 
COEFFICIENT 
-3.401978 -2.2254673 -51.634869 
 
                                     PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
Explanatory variables RE OLS GMM 
GROWTH  t-1 - *** - - *** 
GROWTH  t-2 - *** - *** - *** 
PRIVDEBT t-1 - *  -  - * 
PRIVDEBT t-2 + * +  + * 
Constant - ** +  -  
Number of observations 138 138 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    2.89 
  Prob > chi2 =    
0.0892 
F(1,   102) =    1.02 
Prob > F =    0.3142 
chi2(1) =    3.07 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0796 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 
0) 
chi2(2) =    6.41 
  Prob > chi2 =    
0.0405 
F(2,   102) =    0.87 
 Prob > F =    0.4221 
chi2(2) =    5.50 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0640 
GRANGER 
COEFFICIENT 
0.229842 -0.2906386 -28.27636 
+ Positive effect; - negative effect. * Statistically significant at 10%; ** statistically significant at 5%; *** statistically 
significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable: “GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 year % change); explanatory 
variable: “PRIVDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of private debt as a % of GDP  (consolidated, 
annual data). 
 
Concerning the causality running from the real GDP growth rate to the growth rate of 
the private debt to GDP ratio, the results summarised in Table 8 show that although not 
statistically strong, in the majority of the estimations, we obtain positive Granger 
coefficients. This finding shows the general tendency towards the positive causality of 
economic growth on the growth of the private debt to GDP ratio. In addition, the results 
of the Wald tests clearly validate this conclusion, at least for Panel 1 (considering 2001–
2012) when we opt to use the dynamic GMM, two-step system, robust panel estimations. 
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TABLE 8 – CAUSALITY RUNNING FROM ECONOMIC GROWTH TO 
PRIVATE DEBT  
                                     PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
Explanatory variables RE OLS GMM 
PRIVDEBT t-1 + - + ***   
PRIVDEBT t-2 -  -  +  
GROWTH  t-1 +  -  + *** 
GROWTH  t-2 +  -  +  
Constant + ***  -  + *** 
Number of observations 306 306 306 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    0.01 
Prob > chi2 =    0.9320 
F(1,   264) =    0.34 
Prob > F =    0.5625 
chi2(1) =   19.96 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 
0) 
chi2(2) =    0.27 
Prob > chi2 =    0.8722 
F(2,   264) =    0.17 
Prob > F =    0.8415 
chi2(2) =   22.72 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
GRANGER 
COEFFICIENT 
 
0.0008489 
 
-0.0016982 
 
0.0139963 
 
                                     PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
Explanatory variables RE OLS GMM 
PRIVDEBT t-1 + + + 
PRIVDEBT t-2 -  -  -  
GROWTH  t-1 +  - ***  + 
GROWTH  t-2 +  +  -  
Constant + *** -  + *  
Number of observations 138 138 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    0.29 
Prob > chi2 =    0.5915 
F(1,   102) =    6.63 
Prob > F =    0.0115 
chi2(1) =    1.21 
Prob > chi2 =    0.2718 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 
0) 
chi2(2) =    0.46 
Prob > chi2 =    0.7942 
F(2,   102) =    5.89 
Prob > F =    0.0038 
chi2(2) =    1.88 
Prob > chi2 =    0.3915 
GRANGER 
COEFFICIENT 
 
0.0015719 
 
-0.0021887 
 
0.0041108 
+ Positive effect; - negative effect. * Statistically significant at 10%; ** statistically significant at 5%; *** statistically 
significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable: “PRIVDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of private debt as a % of GDP 
(consolidated, annual data); explanatory variable: “GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 
year % change). 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper contributes to the debate on the possible panel Granger causality relations 
between three debt categories (public, foreign and private debt) and economic growth 
in the 28 EU countries during the past decade for 2001 and 2012 and, in particular, after 
the outbreak of the recent global financial crisis (2007–2012).  
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The empirical results were obtained through three panel estimations: first, random-
effects estimations (which, according to the Hausman tests are preferred to fixed-effects 
estimations); second, OLS robust estimations; and third, dynamic GMM robust 
estimations, which allow us to correct for the endogeneity problem. 
The results obtained prove the existence of statistically significant bidirectional Granger 
causality relations between growth in public debt and the real GDP growth rate. More 
precisely, the analysis finds evidence of some Keynesian effects as there is a positive 
impact of public debt on economic growth, which is particularly clear after the outbreak 
of the global financial crisis (our second panel). Moreover, the results obtained for both 
time panels (before and after the crisis) show that reverse causality ( running from 
economic growth to public debt) is not only negative but statistically stronger, allowing 
us to conclude that if EU countries increase their real GDP growth rate, they should not 
worry about the consequences of this increase on public debt. 
Our panel Granger causality empirical estimations also confirm that foreign debt was 
not particularly relevant for the real GDP growth of the 28 EU countries during the past 
decade. The obtained Granger coefficients in general point to positive bidirectional 
causality between foreign debt and economic growth but the results are not statistically 
strong. 
Regarding private debt, there is evidence of the relevance of the negative impact of its 
growth on real GDP growth throughout the decade (2001–2012). For the reverse 
causality running from economic growth to private debt, the results are not unanimous 
or statistically strong, but economic growth seems to contribute positively to private 
debt. 
Summarising, our results are in line with those that underline that we should never 
consider that “debt is debt”. They confirm that during the past decade, for the universe 
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of the 28 EU countries, public debt was relevant to economic growth but, at the same 
time and with even more strength, economic growth had clear negative causality effects 
on the growth in public debt. Furthermore, these effects were statistically more relevant 
after the outbreak of the global financial crisis, when some EU countries faced problems 
with their sovereign debt. 
Not surprisingly, our estimates confirm that foreign debt is not a central issue for the 
economic growth of developed countries. Further, not as clearly as for public debt but 
with statistically higher relevance than for foreign debt, the results obtained for private 
debt showed the negative causality effects running from this debt to economic growth 
as well as a general tendency towards positive causality from economic growth to the 
growth in the private debt to GDP ratio. 
Further research is needed for a better understanding of the links between the relevant 
EU countries’ debt levels and economic growth as well as the possible individual 
differences among member states as they had and still have to face different levels of 
indebtedness and do not evolve with the same growth rate. 
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APPENDIX I – Summary Statistics and Correlations 
PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 SUMMARY STATISTICS: 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
“GROWTH”:      
overall -.2899351   4.095345      -17.7       16.7 N = 308     
between  .2284929   -.9636364   .0818182 n = 28      
within  4.089174   -17.71721   16.62825 T = 11     
      
“PUBDEBT”:      
overall .0345482    .1723199    -1.216305 1.232953 N = 308     
between  .0452536      -.1156258 .112433 n = 28      
within  .1664722     -1.207529 1.24173 T = 11     
      
“FORDEBT”:      
Overall .2782466    54.50055      -421.8999 754.8 N = 308     
Between  5.353607      -16.9    6.281818 n = 28      
Within  54.24558   -418.3671   758.3328 T = 11     
      
“PRIVDEBT”:      
overall .0460892     .0971858   -.5458403 .8897047 N = 308     
between  .0298247   -.0165463   .1366998 n = 28      
within  .0926528     -.5487262 .8868188 T = 11     
 
 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE THREE PROXIES OF DEBT 
 “PUBDEBT” “FORDEBT”: “PRIVDEBT” 
“GROWTH” -0.2913    -0.0761 -0.2398    
 
 
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
 SUMMARY STATISTICS: 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
“GROWTH”:      
overall -1.007857    5.80108       -17.7 16. N = 140     
between  .4470923      -1.98       -.36 n = 28      
within  5.784323    -17.48786 16.61214 T = 5     
      
“PUBDEBT”:      
overall .1101316    .1622219   -.2275136   .7884574 N = 140     
between  .0842311    -.0102063 .3101438 n = 28      
within  .1393744    -.249131   .6402113 T = 5     
      
“FORDEBT”:      
Overall 1.317857    79.26713      -421.8999 754.8 N = 140     
Between  12.94104     -36.94    46.76001 n = 28      
Within  78.23444   -467.3421   709.3579 T = 5     
      
“PRIVDEBT”:      
overall .0253331    .100566   -.2479162   .8897047 N = 140     
between  .0349167    -.0527914 .1321813 n = 28      
within  .0944956    -.270133   .7828565 T = 5     
 
 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE THREE PROXIES OF DEBT 
 “PUBDEBT” “FORDEBT”: “PRIVDEBT” 
“GROWTH” -0.3800    -0.0691    -0.4060    
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APPENDIX II – CAUSALITY BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC 
DEBT 
 
 
II - A - FROM “PUBDEBT TO “GROWTH” 
RANDOM-EFFECTS ESTIMATIONS 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                   z            P>|z|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.                    z            P>|z|  
GROWTH  t-1 -.2233602        -4.08       0.000 -.4050385       -6.59        0.000 
GROWTH  t-2 -.346336          -6.31       0.000 -.4495522       -7.63        0.000 
PUBDEBT t-1 .0324406          0.05       0.963 1.317386         1.92        0.055 
PUBDEBT t-2 .3621599          0.52       0.601 3.941395         5.65        0.000 
Constant -.2603777        -1.20       0.231     -.7935379       -2.37        0.018 
R-squared within   0.1618 0.6243 
R-squared between   0.2470 0.0001 
R-squared overall   0.1571 0.5605 
 Wald chi2(4)       =     56.09  
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
Wald chi2(4)       =     169.59 
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    0.00 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.9630 
chi2(1) =    3.67 
        Prob > chi2 =    0.0553 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) chi2(2) =    0.28 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.8710 
chi2(2) =   36.56 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 0.3946005 5.258781 
 
                                                      OLS ROBUST ESTIMATIONS (*) 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                 t             P>|t|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.               t            P>|t|  
GROWTH  t-1 -.1320992     -1.26         0.210     -.1106989        -1.09       0.280 
GROWTH  t-2 -.2842081     -3.59         0.000     -.3050545        -3.39       0.001 
PUBDEBT t-1 .1487306       0.38         0.703 2.067587           1.90      0.061 
PUBDEBT t-2 .1359965       0.28         0.783 2.430291           3.67      0.000 
Constant .4487097       0.56         0.574 -.4175678         -0.52      0.604 
R-squared                        0.7046 0.8102 
 F ( 41,   264) = 10.67  
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
F( 35,   102) =   11.68 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0)        F(1,   264) =    0.15 
            Prob > F =    0.7033 
       F(1,   102) =    3.60 
            Prob > F =    0.0607 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0)        F(2,   264) =    0.09 
            Prob > F =    0.9148 
     F(2,   102) =    7.52 
           Prob > F =    0.0009 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 0.2847271 4.497878 
(*)Year and country dummies are included in these OLS estimations and their specific results are available 
on request. 
 
             DYNAMIC GMM, TWO-STEP SYSTEM,  ROBUST ESTIMATIONS 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                z              P>|z|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.                 z                P>|z|  
GROWTH  t-1 -.590364        -3.63         0.000 -.6336308    -8.09           0.000 
GROWTH  t-2 -.4085589      -9.88         0.000 -.3597416    -8.05           0.000 
PUBDEBT t-1 -11.06192      -1.95         0.051 3.93417        2.52           0.012 
PUBDEBT t-2 16.72723        2.76         0.006 11.65218      3.95           0.000 
Constant -.1672583      -0.86         0.390 -.4046984     -0.55          0.585 
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 Wald chi2(4)  =    113.47
            Prob > chi2   =     0.000 
Wald chi2(4)  =    133.62 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in  
first differences 
z =  -2.20   
Pr > z =  0.028 
 z =  -2.94   
Pr > z =  0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 
z =   1.17   
Pr > z =  0.242 
z =   0.52  
 Pr > z =  0.605 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions chi2(16)   =  54.41   
Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
chi2(4)    =   6.39   
Prob > chi2 =  0.172 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    3.82 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0508 
           chi2(1) =    6.33 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0119 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) chi2(2) =    9.29 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0096 
chi2(2) =   15.60 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0004 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 5.66531 15.58635 
Dependent variable: “GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 year % change); 
explanatory variable: “PUBDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of the general government 
gross debt, Maastricht debt, (as a % of GDP -  annual data). 
 
II - B – FROM “GROWTH” TO “PUBDEBT” 
RANDOM-EFFECTS ESTIMATIONS 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                   z            P>|z|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.                    z            P>|z|  
PUBDEBT t-1 -.0230818      -0.75         0.453 -.0534819      -2.05         0.040 
PUBDEBT t-2 .04638             1.52         0.128 -.0702985      -2.65         0.008 
GROWTH  t-1 -.0114307       -4.74         0.000 -.0064314      -2.80         0.005 
GROWTH  t-2 -.002155         -0.89         0.373 .000902          0.41         0.683 
Constant .0371361         3.88         0.000 .1117              7.75         0.000 
R-squared within   0.0768 0.2313 
R-squared between   0.0856 0.0003 
R-squared overall   0.0754 0.1484 
 Wald chi2(4)       =     24.54  
Prob > chi2        =    0.0001 
Wald chi2(4)       =     26.11  
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =   22.43 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
chi2(1) =    7.83 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0051 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) chi2(2) =   22.43 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
chi2(2) =    8.88 
               Prob > chi2 =    0.0118 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT -0.0135857 -0.0055294 
 
                                                      OLS ROBUST ESTIMATIONS (*) 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                 t             P>|t|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.               t            P>|t|  
PUBDEBT t-1 -.0773213     -1.10         0.273 -.0718823         -1.21       0.230 
PUBDEBT t-2 .0110968        0.50        0.615 -.0456426         -1.22       0.227 
GROWTH  t-1 -.0134003      -2.73        0.007 -.011594           -2.71       0.008 
GROWTH  t-2 -.0030529      -0.66        0.512 .0030946           0.52       0.602 
Constant .07121             1.80        0.072 -.0061548         -0.15       0.883 
R-squared   0.3264 0.4677 
 F( 41,   264) =    6.07  
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
F( 35,   102) =   10.85  
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) F(1,   264) =    7.47 
            Prob > F =    0.0067 
F(1,   102) =    7.32 
            Prob > F =    0.0080 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0)        F(2,   264) =    4.14 
            Prob > F =    0.0169 
F(2,   102) =    5.85 
            Prob > F =    0.0039 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT -0.0164532 -0.0084994 
31 
 
(*)Year and country dummies are included in these OLS estimations and their specific results are available 
on request.  
             DYNAMIC GMM, TWO-STEP SYSTEM, ROBUST ESTIMATIONS 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                z              P>|z|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.                 z             P>|z|  
PUBDEBT t-1 -.2369149      -1.57         0.116 -.4713857    -4.04         0.000 
PUBDEBT t-2 .030208          0.30         0.767 -.3362134    -3.69         0.000 
GROWTH  t-1 -.0195997      -5.22        0.000 -.0105937    -3.81         0.000 
GROWTH  t-2 -.0052129      -0.54        0.590     -.0102347     -2.15        0.031 
Constant .037641          4.30        0.000 .1201127       3.53        0.000 
 Wald chi2(4)  =     74.61  
Prob > chi2   =     0.000 
Wald chi2(4)  =     42.88 
Prob > chi2   =  0.000    
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in  
first differences 
z =  -1.53   
Pr > z =  0.127 
z =   1.20   
Pr > z =  0.230 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 
z =   0.10   
Pr > z =  0.920 
z =   1.98   
Pr > z =  0.048 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions chi2(16)   = 202.42   
Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
chi2(4)    =  27.00   
Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =   27.25 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
chi2(1) =   14.52 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0001 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) chi2(2) =   61.24 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
chi2(2) =   14.57 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0007 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT -0.0248126 -0.0208284 
Dependent variable: “PUBDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of the general government 
gross debt, Maastricht debt, (as a % of GDP -  annual data); explanatory variable: “GROWTH”  = First 
difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 year % change). 
 
APPENDIX III – CAUSALITY BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND 
FOREIGN DEBT 
 
 
III - A - FROM “FORDEBT” TO “GROWTH” 
RANDOM-EFFECTS ESTIMATIONS 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                   z            P>|z|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.                    z            P>|z|  
GROWTH  t-1 -.2208268        -4.24        0.000 -.3851439      -6.27        0.000 
GROWTH  t-2 -.3549143        -6.81        0.000 -.5865605      -9.55        0.000 
FORDEBT t-1 -.0002568        -0.25        0.805 .0011909        1.04        0.301 
FORDEBT t-2 .0007581          0.71        0.476 -.0001079      -0.09        0.927 
Constant -.261676          -1.20        0.228     -.8783332      -2.33        0.020 
R-squared within   0.1624 0.4635 
R-squared between   0.3255                       0.0478 
R-squared overall   0.1579 0.4442 
 Wald chi2(4)       =     56.44  
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
Wald chi2(4)       =    106.29  
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    0.06 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.8054 
chi2(1) =    1.07 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.3006 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) chi2(2) =    0.57 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.7508 
chi2(2) =    1.09 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.5800 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT -0.0005013 0.001083 
 
                                                      OLS ROBUST ESTIMATIONS (*) 
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 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                 t             P>|t|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.               t            P>|t|  
GROWTH  t-1 -.1351227      -1.28         0.203 -.1083542        -0.91       0.363 
GROWTH  t-2 -.2951691      -3.69         0.000 -.4631949        -4.49       0.000 
FORDEBT t-1 .0001754        0.48         0.632 .0013813          5.83       0.000 
FORDEBT t-2 .0008488        1.31         0.192     -.0005326        -1.14       0.255 
Constant .5585865        0.69         0.488 .7868381          0.89       0.376 
R-squared   0.7060 R-squared     =  0.7822 
 F( 41,   264) =   10.49
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
F( 35,   102) =   14.25  
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) F(1,   264) =    0.23 
            Prob > F =    0.6316 
 F(1,   102) =   33.98 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) F(2,   264) =    0.88 
            Prob > F =    0.4163 
F(2,   102) =   24.33 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 0.0010242 0.0008487 
(*)Year and country dummies are included in these OLS estimations and their specific results are available 
on request.  
 
             DYNAMIC GMM, TWO-STEP SYSTEM,  ROBUST ESTIMATIONS 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                z              P>|z|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.                  z               P>|z|  
GROWTH  t-1 -.2702041      -3.16        0.002 -.4725111      -6.02        0.000 
GROWTH  t-2 -.4487575     -16.52       0.000 -.7426212     -15.33       0.000 
FORDEBT t-1 -.0147765      -1.19        0.236 .0101219        0.75        0.456 
FORDEBT t-2 .0083305        1.25        0.212 .0014447        0.21        0.837 
Constant -.2303014      -2.05        0.040 -.8220535      -1.15        0.251 
 Wald chi2(4)  =    521.88  
Prob > chi2   =     0.000 
Wald chi2(4)  =    364.25  
Prob > chi2   =     0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in  
first differences 
z =  -2.21   
Pr > z =  0.027 
z =  -1.72 
Pr > z =  0.086 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 
z =   0.65   
Pr > z =  0.514 
z =   2.74   
Pr > z =  0.006 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions chi2(16)   = 125.28   
Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
chi2(4)    =  57.45   
Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(2) =    1.67 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.4334 
chi2(2) =    0.64 
  Prob > chi2 =    0.7278 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) chi2(1) =    1.41 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.2356 
chi2(1) =    0.56 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.4560 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT -0.0094345 0.0115659 
Dependent variable: “GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 year % change); 
explanatory variable: “FORDEBT” = First difference of the net external debt as a % GDP (annual data). 
 
III - B – FROM “GROWTH” TO “FORDEBT” 
RANDOM-EFFECTS ESTIMATIONS 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                   z            P>|z|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.                    z            P>|z|  
FORDEBT t-1 -.0114182        -0.77       0.440 -.0353006      -1.77       0.077 
FORDEBT t-2 -.0339712        -2.25       0.024 .0540131        2.65        0.008 
GROWTH  t-1 2.016653          2.73       0.006 1.9971            1.87        0.061     
GROWTH  t-2 .0134947          0.02       0.985 .1588861        0.15        0.882     
Constant -.1662664        -0.05      0.957 1.295007        0.20        0.843 
R-squared within   0.0506                       0.1177                       
R-squared between   0.0721                       0.3113                       
R-squared overall   0.0433                       0.1020 
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 Wald chi2(4)       =     13.61 
Prob > chi2        =    0.0086 
Wald chi2(4)       =     15.10  
Prob > chi2        =    0.0045 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    7.47 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0063 
chi2(1) =    3.50 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0612 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) chi2(2) =    7.71 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0211 
chi2(2) =    3.65 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1616 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 2.030623 2.1559861 
 
                                                      OLS ROBUST ESTIMATIONS (*) 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                 t             P>|t|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.               t            P>|t|  
FORDEBT t-1 -.0189398       -1.10       0.271 -.0140472        -0.44        0.661 
FORDEBT t-2 -.0443514       -1.59       0.114 .0877555          1.13        0.263 
GROWTH  t-1 1.154316         0.87        0.385 -.1995168        -0.15        0.882 
GROWTH  t-2 1.136223         0.75        0.454 3.120511          1.41        0.161 
Constant -19.28817       -1.14        0.253 -24.26261        -0.80       0.423 
R-squared   0.0778 0.1817 
 F( 41,   264) =    0.81  
Prob > F      =  0.7925 
F( 35,   102) =    1.74 
Prob > F      =  0.0169 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) F(1,   264) =    0.76 
            Prob > F =    0.3855 
F(2,   102) =    1.60 
            Prob > F =    0.2061 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) F(2,   264) =    0.51 
            Prob > F =    0.6029 
F(1,   102) =    0.02 
            Prob > F =    0.8824 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 2.290539 2.920993 
(*)Year and country dummies are included in these OLS estimations and their specific results are available 
on request. 
 
             DYNAMIC GMM, TWO-STEP SYSTEM,  ROBUST ESTIMATIONS 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                z              P>|z|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.                   z                P>|z|  
FORDEBT t-1 -.0872123     -0.80          0.424 .1733591       2.62          0.009 
FORDEBT t-2 -.1307113     -1.74          0.082 -.0059937      -0.13         0.893 
GROWTH  t-1 20.96321       1.44          0.150 36.52501       1.92          0.054 
GROWTH  t-2 -3.317715     -0.61          0.543 -15.81478     -1.93         0.053 
Constant -2.820197     -0.60          0.551 -13.95315     -2.33         0.020      
 Wald chi2(4)  =    180.32  
Prob > chi2   =     0.000 
Wald chi2(4)  =     37.06  
Prob > chi2   =     0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in  
first differences 
z =  -1.28   
Pr > z =  0.200 
z =  -1.87   
Pr > z =  0.062 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 
z =  -1.33   
Pr > z =  0.183 
z =  -1.86   
Pr > z =  0.063 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions chi2(16)   =  37.92   
Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
chi2(4)    =   4.41   
Prob > chi2 =  0.354 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    2.07 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1501 
chi2(1) =    3.70 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0543 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) chi2(2) =    2.71 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.2582 
chi2(2) =    4.38 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1120 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 17.64606 20.71023 
Dependent variable: “FORDEBT” = First difference of the net external debt as a % GDP (annual data); 
explanatory variable: “GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 year % change). 
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APPENDIX IV – CAUSALITY BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND 
PRIVATE DEBT 
 
 
IV - A - FROM “PRIVDEBT” TO “GROWTH” 
RANDOM-EFFECTS ESTIMATIONS 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                   z            P>|z|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.                     z            P>|z|  
GROWTH  t-1 -.2581099       -4.86        0.000 -.4027601       -6.44       0.000 
GROWTH  t-2 -.4035555       -7.58        0.000 -.5578443       -8.94       0.000 
PRIVDEBT t-1 -1.021367       -1.41        0.157 -2.043061       -1.70       0.089 
PRIVDEBT t-2 -2.380611       -3.29        0.001 2.272903         1.89       0.059 
Constant -.2487082       -1.17        0.243 -.8678609       -2.35       0.019 
R-squared within   0.1984 0.4849 
R-squared between   0.1489 0.0574 
R-squared overall   0.1911 0.4654 
 Wald chi2(4)       =     71.11  
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
Wald chi2(4)       =    115.79 Prob > 
chi2        =    0.0000 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    2.00 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1573 
chi2(1) =    2.89 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0892 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) chi2(2) =   12.95 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0015 
chi2(2) =    6.41 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0405 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT -3.401978 0.229842 
 
                                                      OLS ROBUST ESTIMATIONS (*) 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                 t             P>|t|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.                 t              P>|t|  
GROWTH  t-1 -.1436103      -1.31        0.190 -.1405647      -1.17        0.245 
GROWTH  t-2 -.3357991      -3.99        0.000 -.4529828      -4.16        0.000 
PRIVDEBT t-1 -.4015023      -1.10        0.274 -1.060862      -1.01        0.314 
PRIVDEBT t-2 -1.823965      -3.80        0.000 .7702234        0.70         0.486 
Constant .7586146        0.94        0.350 .7490947        0.82         0.412 
R-squared   0.7165 0.7801 
 F( 41,   264) =   10.86  
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
F( 35,   102) =    9.80  
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) F(1,   264) =    1.20 
            Prob > F =    0.2736 
F(1,   102) =    1.02 
            Prob > F =    0.3142 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) F(2,   264) =    7.21 
            Prob > F =    0.0009 
F(2,   102) =    0.87 
            Prob > F =    0.4221 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT -2.2254673 -0.2906386 
(*)Year and country dummies are included in these OLS estimations and their specific results are available 
on request.  
             DYNAMIC GMM, TWO-STEP SYSTEM,  ROBUST ESTIMATIONS 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                z              P>|z|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.                  z                P>|z|  
GROWTH  t-1 -.7351267     -6.01         0.000 -.8081409      -4.37         0.000 
GROWTH  t-2 -.6027265     -9.65         0.000 -.4417446      -3.41         0.001 
PRIVDEBT t-1 -49.98507     -2.77         0.006 -49.20136      -1.75         0.080 
PRIVDEBT t-2 -1.649799     -0.96         0.335 20.925            1.84         0.066 
Constant .0946618        0.14        0.886 -.0289164      -0.03         0.974 
 Wald chi2(4)  =    178.95 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000 
Wald chi2(4)  =    366.41  
Prob > chi2   =     0.000 
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Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in  
first differences 
z =  -1.27   
Pr > z =  0.205 
z =  -1.75 
Pr > z =  0.081 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 
z =  -1.44   
Pr > z =  0.151 
z =   0.26   
Pr > z =  0.793 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions chi2(16)   =  14.36   
Prob > chi2 =  0.572 
chi2(4)    =   4.41   
Prob > chi2 =  0.353 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    7.68 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0056 
chi2(1) =    3.07 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0796 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) chi2(2) =   10.33 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0057 
chi2(2) =    5.50 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0640 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT -51.634869 -28.27636 
Dependent variable: “GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP growth rate (1 year % change); 
explanatory variable: “PRIVDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of private debt as a % of 
GDP (consolidated, annual data). 
 
IV - B - FROM “GROWTH” to “PRIVDEBT” 
RANDOM-EFFECTS ESTIMATIONS 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                   z            P>|z|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.                    z            P>|z|  
PRIVDEBT t-1 .0100897         0.53         0.594 .0347807         1.25        0.210 
PRIVDEBT t-2 -.0294696       -1.55        0.120 -.0324014       -1.17       0.242 
GROWTH  t-1 .0001189         0.09         0.932     .0007738          0.54       0.591 
GROWTH  t-2 .00073             0.52         0.601 .0007981          0.55       0.579 
Constant .0463948         8.31         0.000      .0238753          2.80       0.005 
R-squared within   0.0136 0.0305 
R-squared between   0.0001 0.0002 
R-squared overall   0.0122 0.0265 
 Wald chi2(4)       =      3.73  
Prob > chi2        =    0.4437 
Wald chi2(4)       =      3.63  
Prob > chi2        =    0.4589 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =    0.01 
Prob > chi2 =    0.9320 
chi2(1) =    0.29 
Prob > chi2 =    0.5915 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) chi2(2) =    0.27 
Prob > chi2 =    0.8722 
chi2(2) =    0.46 
Prob > chi2 =    0.7942 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 0.0008489 0.0015719 
 
                                                      OLS ROBUST ESTIMATIONS (*) 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                 t             P>|t|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.               t            P>|t|  
PRIVDEBT t-1 -.0065275     -0.49         0.625 .0191238           0.33       0.745 
PRIVDEBT t-2 -.0519649     -1.35         0.179 -.0323067        -1.03       0.306 
GROWTH  t-1 -.0013251      -0.58        0.563 -.0041618        -2.58       0.011 
GROWTH  t-2 -.0003731      -0.14        0.892 .0019731          1.11        0.271 
Constant -.0328288      -1.10        0.274 -.012064          -0.50       0.621 
R-squared   0.3178 0.4352 
 F( 41,   264) =    5.97 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
F( 35,   102) =    6.73  
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) F(1,   264) =    0.34 
Prob > F =    0.5625 
F(1,   102) =    6.63 
Prob > F =    0.0115 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) F(2,   264) =    0.17 
Prob > F =    0.8415 
F(2,   102) =    5.89 
Prob > F =    0.0038 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT -0.0016982 -0.0021887 
(*)Year and country dummies are included in these OLS estimations and their specific results are available 
on request. 
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             DYNAMIC GMM, TWO-STEP SYSTEM,  ROBUST ESTIMATIONS 
 
 PANEL 1 (2001–2012) 
 coef.                z              P>|z|  
PANEL 2 (2007–2012) 
coef.                 z                P>|z|  
PRIVDEBT t-1 .0846625        2.59        0.010 .4919798       0.68         0.499 
PRIVDEBT t-2 .0319225        1.15        0.248 -.6365268     -0.68         0.498 
GROWTH  t-1 .0116363        4.47        0.000 .0059178       1.10         0.272 
GROWTH  t-2 .002346          0.73        0.464 -.001807       -0.18         0.859 
Constant .0401988        6.08        0.000 .0198653       1.71         0.087 
 Wald chi2(4)  =     33.62 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000 
Wald chi2(4)  =     74.96  
Prob > chi2   =     0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in  
first differences 
z =  -1.58   
Pr > z =  0.114 
z =  -0.70   
Pr > z =  0.485 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 
z =  -1.39 
Pr > z =  0.164 
z =   0.10   
Pr > z =  0.918 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions chi2(16)   = 177.53   
Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
chi2(4)    =  10.42   
Prob > chi2 =  0.034 
Number of observations 306 138 
WALD TEST (t-1 =0) chi2(1) =   19.96 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
chi2(1) =    1.21 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.2718 
WALD TEST (t-1 = t-2 = 0) chi2(2) =   22.72 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
chi2(2) =    1.88 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.3915 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 0.0139963 0.0041108 
Dependent variable: “PRIVDEBT” = First difference of the natural logarithm of private debt as a % of 
GDP (consolidated, annual data); explanatory variable: “GROWTH” = First difference of the real GDP 
growth rate (1 year % change). 
 
